Political Behaviour of the Bulgarian Muslim Community by Chukov, V.
Regional Issues2 6 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  4 / 9 9
Easter n Eur o pe
VL A D I M I R  C H U K OV Political Behaviour 
of the B u l g a r i a n
Muslim Community
The changes in the last decade for Muslims
in Bulgaria are all the more significant when
seen against the background of the situa-
tion prior: the regime of the last communist
president T. Jivkov carried out (like that of
Miloshevic in Yugoslavia) a kind of ethnic
cleansing by challenging the local Muslims
through changing their Turkic-Arab names
into Slavic ones. Also the emigration proc-
ess was indicative of the situation: in the
summer of 1989, 500,000 Bulgarian Muslims
left the country to settle in Turkey. Yet de-
spite the considerable reduction of the
community, the Muslim population in Bul-
garia is still quite large. According to the of-
ficial census in 1992, there were 1,110,295
Muslims registered (800,052 of which de-
clared themselves Turks, 313,396 Gypsies,
4,515 Tartars and other Muslim minorities).
Due to the deterioration of the economic
conditions, Bulgarian Muslims (especially
the Turks) massively migrated to Turkey.
This process is still going on up to the pre-
sent day and because of the illegal forms of
migration, the exact size of the Bulgarian
Muslim community is still unknown. 
After the installation of a competitive po-
litical system, the Bulgarian Muslim commu-
nity seems to be an attractive electoral area
for the newly established Bulgarian parties.
However, the community has made it clear
that it possesses its own electoral potation
for transforming itself from an object to a
subject in Bulgarian political life.
The Turks Ð leading Muslim
g r o u p
In June 1990, the Movement of Rights and
Freedoms (MRF) in Varna arose, officially de-
nying that it recruited its activist corpus on
an ethnic and religious principle. Political
reality proves, however, that the party has
become representative of the largest ethnic
group among the Muslims: 90% of its mem-
bership is comprised of Bulgarian Turks. 
Two general issues guaranteed the suc-
cess of this political formation. The charis-
matic leadership of Ahmed Dogan, former
activist against the ÔRevival ProcessÕ and the
special elitism within the party shaped by
him. MRF elitism is strictly conservative, tak-
ing into consideration that the partyÕs oper-
ational leadership is entirely based on Ôeth-
nic and religious quotaÕ. In the Central
Council (the operational party level) the
Turk domination is quite conspicuous with
about 80-85%; the Pomaks (Bulgarian Mus-
lims) are represented by 10-15% and ordi-
narily possesses one vice presidential seat. 
Bulgarian Christians are involved in the
leadership usually with Ôexternal quotaÕ and
realize their political presence through par-
ticipation in the electoral process. They are
deprived of efficacious party competence.
The MRF usually places between 14 and 24
deputies in Parliament (which numbers 240
in total), while the Christian quota is around
2 to 4 seats.
Concealed emphasis on ethnic (coupled
with religious) corporativism is actually the
immanent ideological approach to achiev-
ing the position of a main political group-
ing. It is in this way that the MRFÕs ideologic-
al basis intertwined secular ethnical com-
mitment (adherence to Pan-Turkism, not in
its radical expression) with unconscious, in-
stinctively acquired Islamism (also as a cog-
nitive Ð reflexive behavioural system). Com-
bined, the above mentioned Pan-Turkism
and Islamism became the ideological tools
that MRF elaborated as operational criteria
for attracting new supporters. 
Meanwhile in the short history of post-
communist Bulgarian legislative elections,
Turk support is categorical and can be ex-
pressed by the following: in 1990 there were
540,000 votes for the MRF, approximately
95% of the Turk voters; in 1991 Ð 380 thou-
sand, approximately 80% of the Turk voters;
in 1994 Ð 340 thousand, approximately 90%
of the Turk voters; and in 1997 Ð 250 thou-
sand, approximately 90% of the Turk voters.
The attempts made to marginalize the MRF
Ð forbidding it by an act of the Constitution-
al Court in 1991, provoking schismatic disor-
der within the leadership Ð all remained un-
s u c c e s s f u l .
Schismatic movements
Attempts to remove the ethnic and reli-
gious appearance of the party characterize
MRFÕs official fluctuations and its coalition
policy. Adem Kenan, former MRF deputy,
provoked the first schismatic movement. He
founded the Turkish Democratic Party,
which remains unacknowledged by the
state. His radicalism, based purely on secu-
lar Pan-Turkism, excludes Bulgarian Mus-
lims. The federalist state structure (Bulgari-
an and Turkish autonomy districts) pro-
posed by Kenan had to be considered as un-
dermining internal peace. The extremist
ethnic and religious tendencies had been
eliminated since they grew up at the bosom
of Bulgarian political thought.
Mehmet Hodja, another former party dep-
uty, initiated the second schismatic move-
ment derived from MRF. His Party for Demo-
cratic Changes (PDC) has to be considered
as a personal revolt against the authoritari-
an methods of Dogan. However, PDC ac-
quired a regional profile, strictly limited to
the district of Kardjali, the biggest South-
east Bulgarian town with considerable Mus-
lim (predominantly Turk) presence. In the
legislative elections in 1994, the PDC mobi-
lized 24,000 votes that represented approx-
imately 0,1% of the total votes or 4% of the
Turk voters. This electoral failure announced
its political death.
The next two attempts for dissipating MRF
political and electoral capabilities are relat-
ed with the aspirations of the biggest local
political parties Ð the Bulgarian Socialist Par-
ty (former Communist) and the Union of
Democratic Forces (UDF). The former cata-
pulted Nedim Gendjev, former m u f t i , by aid-
ing him to establish the Democratic Party of
Justice (DPJ). As a former cleric, his political
formation seemed to utilize religious rather
than ethnic slogans, emphasizing contact
with the Arab world. Paradoxically, this was
mixed with socialist egalitarian elements,
which shaped its utopian character and ulti-
mately resulted in failure. The DPJ also re-
mained a regionally represented party.
Gendjev organized bases predominantly in
northeastern Bulgaria, around the city of
Shoumen, ignoring the southeast and the
southwest, also populated by a Muslim
community. The DPJ logically shared the
destiny of the preceding schismatic parties.
It earned 24,000 and 27,000 in the 1994 and
1997 legislative elections, respectively, and
also has been marginalized. 
The last schismatic attempts have been
going on up to the present political disloca-
tions in the country. The UDF, as governing
party since 1997, makes great efforts to iso-
late the MRF leaders from their basic sup-
porters by involving them in different levels
of its political power. Ivan Kostov, UDF lead-
er and current Prime Minister personally of-
fered a few deputy chairs to the former MRF
activists, in opposition to Ahmed Dogan.
Mid-1997 saw the establishment of the
most important duplicate formation. It
adopted the name of National Movement of
Rights and Freedoms (NMRF), a very oppor-
tune electoral tactic, bearing in mind the
potential confusion with the MRF. Guner Ta-
hir, former MRF vice president and deputy,
headed the newly founded party. With UDF
assistance, he quickly constructed a wide
network almost covering the entire country.
However, according to the latest estima-
tions, the anti-MRF effects once more
proved mediocre because of the appeals of
UDF leaders to their MRF opponents to ap-
prove their coalition policy during the ap-
proaching municipal elections. Indeed, on
the eve of October 1999 the MRF conserved
its overwhelming superiority in 30 munici-
palities representing the Muslim communi-
ty and exerts influence in 65 municipalities,
out of 260 in total. 
The most successful political manoeuvre
of MRF leadership, and of Ahmed Dogan
personally, is the ideological juggling with
liberal ideas and slogans. He initiated the
Liberal Democratic Union with the former
president J. Jelev, vice president of Liberal
International. It seems that the contradic-
tion between the officially adopted individ-
ualist ideas and the traditional adjustment
of the Bulgarian Muslims to egalitarism and
social equality does not disturb MRF
founders. First, the liberal veil breaks up and
ÔdissolvesÕ MRF into a Bulgarian political
multitude. Secondly, it places the party
among the family of European liberal par-
ties. Thirdly, it moves the MRF away from
the Socialist Party, which remains its true
electoral competitor.
The others
The community of Pomaks is estimated
between 170,000-200,000. Its political be-
haviour is different from that of the Turks. It
appears that its social and economic margi-
nality, due largely to its rural and especially
mountain-dwelling membership (approxi-
mately 100%), influences and encourages a
kind of ÔregionalizationÕ of political prefer-
ences. Usually its members adopt negative
attitudes towards the dominant regional
political tendencies. If they live alongside
Turks (as in the district of Kardjali) Bulgarian
Muslims generally support the BSP (except
in 1997 when their support was for the
UDF). On the contrary, in the southwest
(Bulgarian Macedonia) the Pomaks ordinari-
ly vote for the MRF, thus denying the UDF
and BSP dominance. 
Bulgarian Muslim Gypsies are electoral
objects whose comportment is categorically
unpredictable. Their extremely high level of
unemployment, lack of education, and
dominant rural status motivate political
passivity and disorientation. All attempts at
establishing a serious political ethnic forma-
tion corresponding to that of the Turkish
MRF have failed. However, in 1998 ÔEuro-
romaÕ was founded, pretending to defend
the Gypsies interests. Its electoral capabili-
ties seem doubtful in as far as its activities
reached only electoral agreements with
MRF and the Bulgarian Euroleft party. 
Analysing the political behaviour of the
Bulgarian Muslim community is quite diffi-
cult. It risks running into inexactitudes due
to the empirical nature of the data. Consid-
ering the characteristic Balkan circumstan-
ces, Bulgarian politicians have to do their
best to promote the possibility of coexist-
ence between Muslim and Christian com-
munities in the country so as to avoid situa-
tions such as that in neighbouring Yugo-
slavia. '
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B u l g a r i a n
G y p s i e s
before the
election day
Since the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria in
1989, all Muslims in the country have come to experi-
ence a changed situation in which democratic conse-
quences are evident: possession of individual rights
and freedoms, intensification of contacts with the
Muslim world, and free political expression. Because
the political heritage of the dismantled communist
system is quite original in Bulgaria, in comparison
with a number of other Balkan countries, a specific
confessional model can be witnessed.
